result, that fund is expected to be exhausted by 2018, many years before the expected exhaustion of the Social Security or Medicare trust funds. 7 The large increase in the proportion of the US population that has been determined to be permanently disabled is also having broader adverse effects on the performance of the US economy. The proportion of US adult males who are available for work has declined from 80 per cent in 1970 to 71 per cent in 2010. 8 As The Economist has documented "Widespread male worklessness has huge economic, fiscal, and social costs."
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Most of the increase in the proportion of the population that has been determined to be permanently disabled is attributable to ALJ decisions that reversed initial SSA decisions that denied applications for benefits on the basis of determinations that the applicants were not disabled. Thus, for instance, a single SSA ALJ overruled SSA and awarded benefits to 2285 applicants in 2007, at a cost to taxpayers of $2.1 billion.
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Unless we address this problem promptly and effectively, it will increase in severity and scope. As the tendency of ALJs to grant benefits that SSA twice denied has become wellknown, there has been a predictable increase in the number of applications for benefits. In 2008 alone, the number of applications increased by 21 per cent, to 2.8 million, 11 and the backlog of cases pending before ALJs reached 752,000. 12 The number of decisions granting benefits increased 28 per cent between 2007 and 2010. 13 Since the average cost of a decision granting disability benefits is $245,000, 14 and ALJs grant benefits in 60% of cases, 15 the total cost of the pending cases alone will be about $117
billion. As a practical matter, ALJ decisions that grant disability benefits are final and irrevocable commitments of taxpayer funds. SSA lacks the resources to review ALJ decisions that grant benefits, 16 and less than one per cent of individuals who are awarded benefits ever leave the rolls of beneficiaries.
17
If there was reason to believe that all, or even most, ALJ decisions granting disability benefits were accurate reflections of the health status of the individual applicants, I would reluctantly accept the high cost of those decisions as one of the costs of living in a humane and compassionate country. There is no reason to indulge that belief, however, and there are many reasons to reject it as highly unlikely.
First, most of the applicants who are awarded benefits by ALJs are determined by the ALJ to have a "nonexertional restriction" -either a mental condition such as anxiety or depression or pain attributable to a musculoskeletal condition. 18 at that hearing. 34 The government is never represented at a hearing before an ALJ. The only government employee at the hearing is the ALJ, who has a duty to assist the applicant in the development of evidence in support of his claim. 35 If the ALJ finds that the applicant is disabled, that decision is final as a practical matter. In theory, SSA can review an ALJ decision that grants an application for benefits, but its past efforts to do so have been thwarted by a combination of judicial resistance and inadequate funding.
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The decision to allow an applicant to appeal two negative decisions made by two examiner/medical advisor teams to an ALJ and to allow an ALJ's decision to grant an application for benefits that has been rejected twice by the bureaucracy to become final must be based on the belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to be accurate than decisions made by two independent examiner/medical advisor teams. There is no basis for that belief, however, and many reasons for the contrary belief. The ALJ has no medical education and, unlike a disability examiner, the ALJ has no medical advisor.
Moreover, unlike the examiner/medical advisor teams, the ALJ's decisionmaking process is not subject to any form of evaluation or other means of assuring the quality of the decisionmaking process. SSA is prohibited from supervising ALJs or evaluating their performance, 37 and SSA's past efforts to implement quality assurance programs applicable to ALJs have been abandoned as a result of hostility from district courts and lack of adequate resources. The belief that ALJ decisions are more likely to be accurate than bureaucratic decisions must be based on the belief that oral hearings yield more accurate findings of fact than decisions based on paper hearings. That belief, in turn, must be based primarily on the belief that the ability to observe the demeanor of a witness helps a decisionmaker determine whether the witness is providing honest and accurate testimony. That belief is longstanding, but it is supported by no evidence, and it is contradicted by a large body of evidence in the psychology literature. benefits at indefensibly high rates. 43 Second, the SSA action against the ALJ is not within SSA's power to take. An agency can take an action of any type against an ALJ, specifically including suspension, only if it persuades another ALJ at the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) that it has "good cause" to take the action. 44 That is extremely difficult in general and impossible in a context in which the ALJ's pattern of decisions is the putative basis for the removal attempt.
A case that the Federal Circuit decided in 2011 illustrates the difficulty of the task of removing an ALJ even in extreme circumstances. 45 An SSA ALJ beat his domestic partner and his young child. 46 The two victims fled to the house of friends, who called the police. 47 The police took pictures of the damage to the faces of the victims and charged the ALJ with battery. 48 SSA filed a petition with MSPB in which it sought to remove the ALJ for good cause. 49 MSPB assigned the case to another ALJ. The presiding ALJ found that the defendant ALJ had not beaten his child and had not struck his domestic partner with his fist. 50 The presiding ALJ stated that he believed the testimony of the defendant ALJ and disbelieved the testimony of the several witnesses who testified for SSA. 51 On review of the ALJ's initial decision, MSPB issued an opinion in which it found that the defendant ALJ had hit his child and hit his domestic partner with his fist.
MSPB then held that the ALJ could be removed for good cause. The court concluded that MSPB had met its burden of explaining adequately why it rejected the presiding ALJ's findings of fact. One judge wrote a concurring opinion, however, in which he expressed concern about the MSPB's basis for its findings and suggested that he would have decided the case for the defendant ALJ in another case that did not involve facts that were so "unusual." 59 It seems highly unlikely that the court would uphold an MSPB decision removing an ALJ for good cause in the much less "unusual" case of an ALJ who has granted benefits in all, or virtually all, of the cases he has decided. Indeed, most courts have reacted with hostility to more subtle SSA attempts to exercise any degree of control over the decisionmaking patterns of ALJs.
60

Potential Solutions
A. Require employers to share the cost of disability decisions
There are many directions we could take in an effort to address this problem.
Some scholars urge adoption of the approach that seems to be yielding improvements in the Netherlands. Dutch law now requires that an applicant's employer pay part of the costs of providing disability benefits for the initial years a beneficiary receives benefits.
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By requiring employers to bear that cost, the Dutch system gives employers incentives to 59 Id. at 538-39. 60 Text at notes 71-81 infra. This option may be worth consideration in the U.S. I do not know how much employers can do to discourage potential applicants from seeking disability benefits through accommodation or assistance, but I am confident that giving employers an incentive to contest an applicant's claim in a proceeding before an ALJ would reduce the number of cases in which ALJs grant benefits to undeserving applicants. At present,
when an applicant appears before an ALJ, he is usually represented by a lawyer who can earn as much as $6000 if he can persuade the ALJ to grant his client benefits. 62 The ALJ, in turn, has a duty to assist the applicant in gathering and presenting the evidence required to determine whether he is disabled. No one represents the agency or the taxpayer in disability proceedings before an ALJ. If employers were required to bear a significant share of the total cost of a grant of disability benefits, they would be likely to retain lawyers to contest applications by employees they believe to be undeserving and the presence of lawyers opposing undeserving applicants would change the outcome of many cases. As the proportion cases in which applicants succeeded in proceedings before
ALJs declined, the number of applicants inevitably would decline as well. Of course, these results could be obtained more directly by adopting the proposal that the Social Security Advisory Board has long made to assign agency lawyers to represent the government in disability hearings. spent engaging in review of prior awards. 66 During the period 1980-83, SSA reviewed a large number of prior awards. SSA found that 40% of the beneficiaries whose cases it reviewed were not disabled. 67 SSA's review programs have elicited strong pushback from courts, advocates for the disabled, and politicians, however. 68 In recent years, SSA has largely abandoned its review programs. 69 It has allocated virtually all of its scarce decisionmaking resources to an understandable effort to reduce the delays in the process of deciding whether to grant benefits. 70 Thus, SSA must be able to identify some new source of resources to fund a review program.
C. Implement SSA quality controls on ALJs
SSA could attempt to address the problem by reinstituting some version of the ALJ quality control programs it implemented in the 1970s and early 1980s. During that period, SSA responded to the problem of delay in the ALJ decisionmaking process by announcing productivity goals for ALJs and it responded to the problems of inconsistency and excessive generosity in ALJ decisionmaking by announcing a presumptive range of decisions to grant benefits. 71 That program elicited strong pushback from courts and from ALJs.
After several district courts held that the program was an unlawful interference with the decisional independence of ALJs, 72 the Second Circuit issued an ambiguous opinion in which it seemed to uphold parts of the program. 73 The court recognized that:
"policies designed to insure a reasonable degree of uniformity among ALJ decisions are not only within the bounds of legitimate agency supervision but are to be encouraged."
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The court expressed "concern," however, that the presumptively permissible range of grants of benefits the agency had announced would put pressure on ALJs to deny benefits in some cases. 75 The court characterized such an effect as "a clear infringement of decisional independence." 76 The court approved of SSA's "reasonable efforts to increase the production levels of ALJs", with the caveat that SSA could only establish reasonable goals and not unreasonable quotas. 
E. Eliminate the right to appeal to an ALJ
Finally, we could eliminate completely the right to appeal a denial of disability benefits to an ALJ. The right to appeal to an ALJ is predicated on the belief that an ALJ decision based on an oral hearing is more likely to yield accurate findings than two bureaucratic decisions based on paper hearings, i.e., consideration of written submissions from the applicant and his supporters and from a variety of medical professionals. There is no evidence to support that belief. There are instead many reasons to believe that two independent decisions based on paper hearings are more likely to yield accurate findings than an ALJ decision based on an oral hearing. 86 The belief that ALJ decisions are more accurate than bureaucratic decisions necessarily is based on some combination of two subsidiary beliefs-that oral hearings are likely to result in more accurate findings than paper hearings and that ALJs are more likely to be unbiased decisionmakers because of their independence from the bureaucracy. Neither of those beliefs is justified.
Making ALJs independent of the agencies that employ them eliminates one potential source of bias, but it simultaneously increases ALJs' vulnerability to other sources of bias. SSA ALJs are located in regional offices. Thus, they decide whether their neighbors are entitled to disability benefits at taxpayer expense. An ALJ can become very popular in the community in which he doles out billions of dollars to applicants for benefits. The desire to be popular in your community can be a powerful source of bias in the SSA disability decisionmaking process. The natural desire to be popular undoubtedly helps to explain the pattern of decisions of the ALJ who granted benefits in 729 of 729 86 Text at notes 18-39 supra.
cases in the first half of 2011 and 1280 of 1284 cases in 2010, at a cost to taxpayers of $492,205,000 in only 18 months.
87 By all accounts, that ALJ relishes his status as one of the most popular people in his city and county. 88 It is fair to infer that the over 100 ALJs who grant benefits in over 90% of cases are affected by the same source of bias.
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Of course, an ALJ who is independent of and, hence, beyond the control of, the agency that employs him, is unusually vulnerable to other potential sources of bias as well. Thus, for instance, it is impossible to describe the pattern of decisions of one of the two ALJs at the Commodities Future Trade Commission as unbiased. That ALJ has never decided a case in favor of an investor, thus demonstrating beyond any doubt his bias against investors.
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The other basis for the belief that oral hearings yield more accurate findings is the widespread assumption that the opportunity of the trier of fact to observe the demeanor of witnesses is an aid to accurate fact-finding. Like the assumption that independence from the government eliminates bias, this assumption is contradicted by a large body of evidence. Numerous studies have found that ability to observe the demeanor of witness is a distraction from the process of finding facts that detracts from the accuracy of the process, rather than an aid to fact finding that improves accuracy.
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I accept the findings of social scientists that applicants for benefits value the opportunity for an oral hearing before an ALJ even if the ALJ decides not to grant the requested benefits. 92 I do not believe, however, that we can afford the massive costs of oral hearings before ALJs merely to assist applicants for benefits in their efforts to accept a negative decision. The direct costs of the ALJ decisionmaking process, in the form of the salary and benefits paid to ALJs is well over $2 billion per year. 93 The direct costs of ALJs are dwarfed by their indirect costs, in the form of scores of billions of dollars paid to undeserving applicants for benefits. 94 We could save scores of billions by removing all of the ALJs who now decide appeals from SSA decisions that deny disability benefits. In 1953 the Supreme Court held that removal of a class of ALJs on the basis of a determination that they are no longer needed or are no longer affordable satisfies the statutory good cause prerequisite for removal. 95 We could then use the over $2 billion dollars in personell cost savings to fund and staff the sorely needed program to review prior awards of benefits to terminate benefits that are now being paid to many thousands of beneficiaries who do not actually satisfy the standard of disability in the Social Security Act. 96 Based on prior experience, that program would yield returns of eleven dollars for every one dollar we invest in it.
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Elimination of the 1400 SSA ALJs would also produce another major benefit to SSA. As Justice (then-professor) Scalia documented in 1979, ALJs impose large costs of two types on agencies. 98 First, they typically have the highest salaries in the agency.
(SES) positions available at an agency. 100 The removal of ALJs from SSA would allow SSA to hire a large number of talented people to manage its important programs by freeing up a large number of SES positions for that purpose. As Justice Scalia put it, the decision to allocate a massive proportion of an agency's personell budget and SES positions to ALJs "represents the triumph of the courtroom mystique over reason."
101
A correllary change should accompany the elimination of ALJs from the disability decisionmaking process. District judges should be instructed to review SSA decisions as final decisions based solely on the record created at the agency. At present, district judges are required to permit applicants who appeal a decision denying benefits to obtain a remand to SSA to allow the applicant to introduce new evidence. 102 That is not the way other agency review proceedings are conducted. 103 The norm in other contexts is judicial review based solely on the record before the agency.
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I anticipate that some people will argue that implementation of my proposal would violate due process. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 105 the Supreme Court upheld the SSA's sole reliance on paper hearings to terminate disability benefits based on an agency finding that a beneficiary is not disabled. The Court made that decision, however, in the context of a decisionmaking process in which SSA made available to anyone who disagreed with such a determination a post-termination oral evidentiary hearing before an ALJ. 106 Thus, it would be fair to say that the Eldridge opinion gave rise to a permissible inference that the Court would have required SSA to provide a dissatisfied applicant for disability benefits the opportunity for an oral evidentiary hearing at some time before or within a reasonable period after SSA makes an initial decision that denies or terminates benefits.
It is highly unlikely that the Court would convert that permissible inference into a holding today, however, for several reasons. First, the reasoning in Eldridge supports the holding in Eldridge and not the inference some read into Eldridge. The Court reasoned that SSA could resolve the kinds of factual disputes that arise in disability disputes with tolerable accuracy based on a paper hearing in which agency officials rely exclusively on written submissions from applicants and doctors. 107 The Court expressed the view that it was not important for the fact finder to be able to observe the demeanor of witnesses in making this class of decisions. Eldridge. 109 Some courts initially balked at that dramatic change in the procedures agencies use to adjudicate disputes, but every circuit has now indicated its approval of that change in many contexts. 110 To paraphrase Justice Scalia, agencies and courts gradually have allowed reason to triumph over the courtroom mystique. 111 Replacing oral hearings with paper hearings in the context of SSA disability decisions would just be another logical step down a road that many agencies and courts have taken with excellent results.
The Present System Is Unconstitutional
Third, any court that confronts a constitutional challenge to the changes I urge should be influenced by its recognition that the present method of SSA disability decisionmaking is clearly unconstitutional. States" who had not been appointed in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause. 117 The court held, two-to one, that FDIC ALJs are employees, rather than officers. 118 The dissenting judge expressed the view that FDIC ALJs are officers. 119 The majority based its disagreement with that conclusion exclusively on one characteristic of the FDIC decisionmaking process. Like most agencies, FDIC's rules authorize an ALJ only to make an "initial decision." 120 The FDIC rules empower the agency to substitute its opinion, including its findings of fact, for the initial decision of an ALJ. 121 The majority concluded that the lack of the power to make a final decision was "critical" to its decision that FDIC ALJs are employees rather than officers. 122 The majority made it clear that it would agree with the dissenting judge if FDIC ALJs had the power to make final decisions. 123 SSA's rules allow an appeal of an ALJ decision to a higher authority in the agency only at the behest of an applicant whose application for benefits has been denied by an ALJ. ALJ decisions that grant benefits are final. The question is whether these separate layers of protection may be combined.
May the President be restricted in his ability to remove a principal officer, who is in turn, restricted in his ability to remove an inferior officer, even though that inferior officer determines the policy and enforces the laws of the United States?
We hold that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President.
125
The Court then explained its holding:
This novel structure does not merely add to the Board's independence, but transforms it. Neither the President nor anyone who is directly responsible to him, nor even an officer whose conduct he may review only for good cause, has full control over the Board. The President is stripped of the power our precedents have preserved, and his ability to execute the laws --by holding his subordinates accountable for their conduct-is impaired.
That arrangement is contrary to Article II's vesting of the executive power in the President.
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The unconstitutionality of the multiple layers of insulation of SSA ALJs from the President follows a fortiori from the holding and reasoning in PCAOB. Indeed, SSA ALJs may even be "principal officers," rather than "inferior officers." To be an "inferior officer," an officer must be inferior to someone. The Court has used two criteria to decide whether an officer is an inferior to a principal officer-the extent of the principal officer's ability to overrule the officer's decisions and the extent of the principal officer's ability to remove the officer. 127 In theory, SSA ALJs work for the Social Security
Commissioner. The Commissioner has not attempted to overrule an ALJ decision to grant disability benefits in decades, however, and he lacks the resources needed to review more than a tiny fraction of such decisions even if he were to decide to devote some of the agency's scarce resources to that task. The Commissioner has no power to remove an ALJ for any reason. Incredibly, the Commissioner is forbidden even to evaluate the performance of ALJs. 128 The Commissioner's only relevant power is the power to petition the MSPB to remove an ALJ for "good cause." That is far short of the powers that the Court requires a principal officer to have with respect to another officer in order to render the other officer "inferior" to the principal officer.
SSA ALJs are insulated from presidential control by three layers of restrictions on the President's power over the executive branch. An SSA ALJ can only be removed by MPSB for "good cause" in response to a petition for removal filed by SSA. An MSPB member can only be removed by the President for "inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." The Social Security Commissioner can only be removed by the 
Conclusion
SSA ALJs are responsible for about 2 per cent of total federal spending in 2011
budget -an amount equivalent to 6 per cent of the 2011 budget deficit. 130 Yet, they are accountable to no one. As a result of this blatantly unconstitutional allocation of power, some SSA ALJs are engaging in unprecedented binge spending while the President and Congress are desperately attempting to identify and to implement the massive spending cuts in virtually all other parts of the budget that are essential to restore a sustainable fiscal policy for the nation.
There are several ways in which we can attempt to address this problem. My preferred solution would be to abolish the ALJ-administered part of the disability decisionmaking process and to use at least part of the resulting savings to implement a system of reviewing past decisions to grant disability benefits to determine whether each beneficiary actually suffers from a permanent disability so serious that he can not perform the functions needed to hold any job in the US economy.
